1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) -  Alibi - Ocular testimony of eye witness  - 3 injured eye witnesses have deposed in the present case - It is a case of day light incident - Injuries on the person of said eye witnesses have been corroborated by other witnesses  - Ocular testimony of eye witnesses cannot be discarded lightly - Once the prosecution has discharged its burden, the burden to prove that accused was not present with other accused at the place of incident and had gone elsewhere, lies on him - Injured eye witnesses have assigned specific role as to how he assaulted S who suffered ante mortem injuries which gets corroborated from the autopsy report - Defence plea of accused  - There is no cavil over the fact that accused was posted as Lab Assistant with the Senior Secondary School -  It is proved on the record that in the proceedings under Section 107/151 of Cr.PC before Executive Magistrate, he was to be present in said case on 17.02.1995 - His presence and role is narrated in detail by the injured eye witnesses -  In view of his role in the incident narrated by the eye witnesses, it is hard to believe that after moving application on 16.02.1995 for casual leave for 17.02.1995, accused attended the school next day in the first half and sought half day leave thereafter -  The attendance register was not seized immediately after the incident -  His plea of alibi is vacillating - Accused has taken false plea of alibi. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 967
  2. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) - Alleged delay in forwarding the F.I.R to the Magistrate - There was no material on record to show or suggest that the F.I.R was tampered or it was fabricated at a later date by antedating it or the delay in sending the F.I.R or the delay in placing it before SDJM by the Sub Inspector of Police or the delay in signing the F.I.R by SDJM was so very vital to doubt the case of the prosecution. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 108
  3. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) - shall also be liable to fine  - Clause shall also be liable to fine, in the context of Indian Penal Code may be capable of being treated as directory and thus conferring on the court a discretion to impose sentence of fine also in addition to imprisonment although such discretion stands somewhat impaired as per the view taken by this Court in the case of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India (1999) 7 SCC 409 - But clearly no minimum fine is prescribed for the offences under the IPC nor that Act was enacted with the special purpose of preventing economic offences as was the case in Chern Taong Shang v. S.D. Baijal (1988) 1 SCC 507  - Employees State Insurance Corporation Act, 1948,  Section 85(a)(i)(b), is an economic offence and therefore the Legislature has not only fixed a minimum term of imprisonment but also a fixed amount of fine of five thousand rupees under Section 85(a)(i)(b) of the Act. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 520
  4. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) Chapter IV -  Alibi -  The word alibi means "elsewhere" - Plea of alibi is not one of the General Exceptions contained in Chapter IV of IPC -  It is a rule of evidence recognized under Section 11 of the Evidence Act -  However, plea of alibi taken by the defence is required to be proved only after prosecution has proved its case against the accused Evidence Act, Section 11.  (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 967
  5. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 149 -  Unlawul assembly -  Convinced that the implication of all the five accused was perfectly justified and was supported by legal evidence as was spoken to by the relevant witnesses which was duly corroborated by the medical evidence - Therefore, mere non mentioning of two of the names in the F.I.R cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 108
  6. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 149 -  Unlawul assembly -  Section 149, at the very outset it refers to participation of each member of an unlawful assembly, it has to be necessarily shown that there was an assembly of five or more persons, which is designated as unlawful assembly under Section 149 I.P.C. - When once, such a participation of five or more persons is shown, who indulge in an offence as a member of such an unlawful assembly, for the purpose of invoking Section 149, it is not necessary that there must be specific overt act played by each of the member of such an unlawful assembly in the commission of an offence -  What is required to be shown is the participation as a member in pursuance of a common object of the assembly or being a member of that assembly, such person knew as to what is likely to be committed in prosecution of any such common object - In the event of the proof of showing of either of the above conduct of a member of an unlawful assembly, the offence, as stipulated in Section 149, will stand proved . (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 108
  7. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 149 - Provisions of Section 149 of the IPC are no longer available to the prosecution for convicting the appellants whose number is reduced to 4 consequent upon the acquittal of the remaining accused persons - It is a case which, in our opinion, falls more appropriately in situation three where the prosecution had named all those constituting the unlawful assembly, but, only four of those named were eventually convicted, thereby reducing the number to less than five - There is no evidence to suggest that any one, apart from the persons named in the charge-sheet were members of the unlawful assembly, but, were either not available or remained unidentified - Such being the position, the conviction of the appellants with the help of Section 149 of the IPC does not appear to be legally sustainable. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 632
  8. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 149 - Unlawful assembly -  It is not disputed that the accused persons were present at the site of the incident and were armed with deadly weapons - They had shared the common intention of stopping the deceased from contesting for the elections - These circumstances are indicative of the fact that all the accused persons, at that time, were the members of unlawful assembly because their common object was to threaten and prevent the deceased and other persons from contesting the College elections. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 588
  9. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)Section 149  - Common Object  Common Intention to kill  Can arise at the spur of the moment  Even if it is assumed that there was no common object of killing, but only of stopping the deceased and others from contesting the elections -  It cannot be ruled out that the common intention to kill might have arisen on the spur of the moment - The actions of the appellants and the injuries inflicted on the body of the deceased also go to substantiate the same . Held, Indian Penal Code, Section 149  has essentially two ingredients viz. (i) offence committed by any member of an unlawful assembly consisting of five or more members, and (ii) such offence must be committed in prosecution of the common object under Section 141 IPC) of the assembly or members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object - For common object, it is not necessary that there should be prior concert in the sense of a meeting of the members of the unlawful assembly, the common object may form on the spur of the moment; it is enough if it is adopted by all the members and is shared by all of them -  Ramachandran and Ors. v. State of Kerala, (2011) 9 SCC 257, relied.      (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 588
  10. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 300 clause (3), 302 IPC 304 Part I - Condition of deceased at time of admission in hospital was serious and injuries received in the head was dangerous to his life  Doctor opined that condition of the deceased at the time of discharge from hospital was not critical and his condition was stable -  Apparent that the death occurred sixty two days after the occurrence due to septicaemia and it was indirectly due to the injuries sustained by the deceased caused in the incident - Prosecution failed to elicit from the Doctor that the head injury sustained by the deceased was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death - Having regard to the fact that deceased survived for sixty two days and that his condition was stable when he was discharged from the hospital, the court cannot draw an inference that the intended injury caused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death so as to attract clause (3) of Section 300 IPC - Conviction under Section 302 IPC modified to Section 304 Part I IPC. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 976
  11. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 300 Exception 4 -  In terms of explanation to Exception 4, it is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 632
  12. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 300 Exception 4 - Keeping in view the nature of the injury, the vital part of the body on which the same was inflicted and the weapon used by the accused, and the medical evidence, that the said injury was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death, culpable homicide would tantamount to murder but for the application of Exception 4 to Section 300 - The circumstances of the case leave no manner of doubt that the incident was without any pre-meditation and a sudden fight upon a sudden quarrel - The injuries upon the deceased were inflicted in the heat of passion and without the appellant taking any undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner - The fact situation of the case, therefore, attracts Exception 4 especially when in terms of explanation to Exception 4, it is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault - Offence committed by the author of the injury is not murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 of the IPC. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 632
  13. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 300, 302 IPC,  304 Part 1  - Intention is different from motive -  It is the intention with which the act is done that makes a difference in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder - Emphasis in Section 300 (3) IPC is on the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause death - Sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature - When the sufficiency exists and death follows, causing of such injury is intended and causing of such offence is murder - For ascertaining the sufficiency of the injury, sometimes the nature of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused and sometimes both are relevant - Depending on the nature of weapon used and situs of the injury, in some cases, the sufficiency of injury to cause death in the ordinary course of nature must be proved and cannot be inferred from the fact that death has, in fact, taken place - Appellant emerged carrying pistol in his hand and fired at the deceased - The weapon used and the manner in which attack was made and the injury was inflicted due to premeditation clearly establish that the appellant intended to cause the injury - Once it is established that the accused intentionally inflicted the injury, then the offence would be murder, if it is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death- Injury was on the inner part of left thigh, which is the non-vital organ - Sufficiency of injury to cause death must be proved and cannot be inferred from the fact that death has taken place - Prosecution has not elicited from the doctors that the gunshot injury on the inner part of left thigh caused rupture of any important blood vessel and that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death - Conviction converted form Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part 1 IPC. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 235
  14. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 302  - Evidence Act,  Section 106 - When an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution - In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed -  The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on the accused to offer -  On the date of occurrence, when accused and his father were in the house and when the father of the accused was found dead, it was for the accused to offer an explanation as to how his father sustained injuries - When the accused could not offer any explanation as to the homicidal death of his father, it is a strong circumstance against the accused that he is responsible for the commission of the crime. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 393
  15. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 302 read with Section 149 - Legal principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal reiterated. Held, that five general principles in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, as follows: An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. If two reasonable c onclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.   (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 554
  16. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 304 Part I - Act committed was with intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death - That even when the act may not have been committed with the intention of causing death, the same was intended to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, within the meaning of Section 304 Part I. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 632
  17. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 304 part II - We find that punishment of five years appears to be just and proper - It could have been even more because eventually the incident resulted in death of a person though the appellant did not intend to cause death of deceased - In the absence of any cross appeal by the State on the issue of quantum of sentence, we do not therefore consider it to be proper to go into the question of adequacy of sentence in this appeal filed by the accused. (2016)3 P.L.R. SC 752
  18. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 304-B - No fine can be imposed in case of conviction for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC - So the sentence of fine imposed by the learned trial Court is liable to be set aside.   (182) P.L.R.
  19. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 304-B - Sentenced to imprisonment for life - That the father of the appellant had also died - His mother had died during the pendency of the trial - So there is no close family member to look after the children - Was allowed interim bail on account of the death of the husband - The co-accused had died during the pendency of the trial - This fact is not disputed that the appellant has no criminal background and even as per the police papers, he is not a previous convict - So the ends of justice will suffice even if the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced - The appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and the sentence of fine, imposed by the learned trial Court, is hereby set aside.   (182) P.L.R.
  20. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 353 - Person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. (S.C.)(182) P.L.R.
  21. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 499, 500, 506 - Defamation - In the reply submitted to the complaint, it was stated that the complainant is habitual of making complaints and he is mentally disturbed - The purpose was not to defame him but to protect his interest - While submitting reply to the notice, no doubt accused in order to bring his case under exception third or ninth to Section 499 IPC must first establish that in making imputations, he acted with due care and attention so as to protect his interest - The imputations need not to be true but it is to be seen whether he has acted with due care and attention - Reply was filed and certain words were uttered just to show his innocence by proving that the other party was habitual of making such complaints - Court - While passing summoning order, the trial Court has not considered the third and ninth exception to Section 499 IPC - Summoning order - Set aside.  (178) P.L.R. 
  22. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) S. 503 - Reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do - Threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. (S.C.)(182) P.L.R.